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Abstract
This paper examines folk theories of algorithmic recommendations on Spotify in order to make visible the cultural
specificities of data assemblages in the global South. The study was conducted in Costa Rica and draws on triangulated
data from 30 interviews, 4 focus groups with 22 users, and the study of “rich pictures” made by individuals to graphically
represent their understanding of algorithmic recommendations. We found two main folk theories: one that personifies
Spotify (and conceives of it as a social being that provides recommendations thanks to surveillance) and another one that
envisions it as a system full of resources (and a computational machine that offers an individualized musical experience
through the appropriate kind of “training”). Whereas the first theory emphasizes local conceptions of social relations to
make sense of algorithms, the second one stresses the role of algorithms in providing a global experience of music and
technology. We analyze why people espouse either one of these theories (or both) and how these theories provide
users with resources to enact different modalities of power and resistance in relation to recommendation algorithms.
We argue that folk theories thus offer a productive way to broaden understanding of what agency means in relation
to algorithms.
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Algorithmic recommendations are key in contempo-
rary processes of surveillance and anticipatory gover-
nance. Scholars have envisioned algorithms as
technologies of “ideological control” (Cohn, 2019)
and crucial pieces in the production of “data subjects”
(Prey, 2018). In both academic and journalistic dis-
course, there is a fundamental concern that
“algorithms are everywhere” and that they are “ruling
our lives,” as the writer of a recent article put it in
Wired magazine (Turk, 2019).
Critical data studies have helped situate the study of
algorithms within the operation of “data assemblages”
(Kitchin and Lauriault, 2014), that is, sociotechnical
networks in which “systems of thought, forms of
knowledge, finance, political economy, governmental-
ities and legalities, materialities and infrastructures,
practices, organisations and institutions, subjectivities
and communities, places, and marketplaces” mutually
constitute each other (Kitchin, 2014: 20). Thus, modes
of thinking, rationalities, and theories have been a con-
cern for critical data scholars. However, the study of
these systems of thought has focused primarily on the
production of data. Concurring with Milan and Trere
(2019), there has been relative disproportionate
“attention to technical aspects to the detriment of
appropriations, practices, and the human agency
around and behind data” (p. 327). From this perspec-
tive, an investigation of data assemblages around issues
like dataveillance and prediction would invite questions
such as: How do users actually make sense of algo-
rithms? How do they think that algorithmic recommen-
dations work?
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In this paper, we follow Iliadis and Russo’s (2016)
call for critical data studies that investigate “meta-the-
oretical modes of conversation and styles of [. . .]
thinking” (p. 2) but argue that this form of investiga-
tion also needs to focus on the users of media technol-
ogies. We seek to understand how people make sense of
datafication processes such as algorithmic recommen-
dations in daily life (Kennedy, 2018). To this end, we
examined how a group of Spotify users in Costa Rica
formulated “folk theories” of how this platform and its
algorithms work. Folk theories are “intuitive, informal
theories that individuals develop to explain the out-
comes, effects, or consequences of technological sys-
tems, which guide reactions to and behavior towards
said systems” (DeVito et al., 2017: 3165). This case is
relevant for critical data studies for various reasons.
First, it focuses on a platform for which algorithms
occupy a crucial position in its technological and eco-
nomic models (Eriksson et al., 2019). Second, it brings
to the fore how people make sense of streaming—a
defining practice and technology of present media
infrastructures (Thibault, 2015).
The focus on Costa Rica is significant given
Spotify’s recent growth in Latin America. According
to the company, this region experienced the fastest
growth in the worldwide number of subscribers in
early 2019 (Iqbal, 2019). Examining the Costa Rican
case also helps going “beyond data universalism”
(Milan and Trere, 2019) by making visible the cultural
specificities of data assemblages in the global South
rather than assuming that they inevitably reproduce
the patterns and processes identified in other places.
In this way, we seek to “question the notion that
engagement with digital media is based on and
informed by a single culture” (Toff and Nielsen,
2018: 638).
Our analysis draws on triangulated data from 30
interviews, 4 focus groups with 22 users, and the
study of “rich pictures” made by individuals to graph-
ically represent how they make sense of algorithmic
recommendations on this platform. We found two
interrelated theories: one that personifies Spotify (and
conceives of it as a social being that provides recom-
mendations thanks to surveillance) and another one
that envisions it as a system full of resources (for
which Spotify is a computational machine that offers
an individualized musical experience through the
appropriate kind of “training”). Whereas the first
theory emphasizes local conceptions of social relations
to make sense of algorithms, the second one stresses the
role of algorithms in providing a global experience of
music and technology. We analyze why people espouse
either one of these theories (or both) and how these
theories provide users with resources to enact different
modalities of power and resistance in relation to
recommendation algorithms. In this way, we argue
that folk theories offer a productive way to broaden
understanding of what agency means in relation to
algorithms.
Enacting data assemblages through folk
theories
We turn to the notion of folk theory to operationalize
the “systems of thought” held by users in data assemb-
lages (Iliadis and Russo, 2016; Kitchin, 2014). Folk
theories are intuitive ways of thinking about things or
issues, which are rooted in evolving practices and expe-
riences, and are functional for individuals who adopt
them (Rip, 2006). They are malleable ways to explain
and act in the world. Folk theories matter because of
how they shape the behavior of those who adopt them:
they “organize experience, generate inferences, guide
learning, and influence behavior and social inter-
actions” (Gelman and Legare, 2011: 380).
We use folk theories to integrate (and expand)
insights and concepts employed in critical data studies
to theorize how people make sense of media technolo-
gies. For example, we see important links between folk
theories and Bucher’s (2018) “algorithmic imaginaries”
or the “ways of thinking about what algorithms are,
what they should be, how they function, and what these
imaginations, in turn, make possible” (p. 113). Like
“imaginaries,” folk theories contemplate what people
think and feel about algorithms and how this leads to
specific ways of acting. In a similar manner, folk theo-
ries incorporate “data valences,” that is, the “wide
range of people’s expectations of and values for data
that emerge from their discourses and practices across
different contexts for data” (Fiore-Gartland and Neff,
2015: 1468).
When scholars have employed the concept of folk
theories in the case of media technologies, they have
usually focused on the mechanisms and affordances on
which platforms rely to recommend content (Rader
and Gray, 2015). Eslami et al. (2016) thus found at
least 10 theories held by users to explain how they
thought that Facebook chose content for their News
Feed. These theories centered on mechanisms such as
how frequently users interacted with others on
Facebook, how many reactions a post had generated,
what formal features characterized a post, and when
was a given content posted, among others. DeVito
et al. (2018) noted that people also draw on informa-
tion that is “exogenous” to platforms to explain how
they work.
Although we share such interest in people’s explan-
ations of mechanisms and affordances, we take a some-
what different approach. We envision folk theories as
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ways to enact data assemblages, that is, to bring into
being a particular “data ontology” (Kitchin and
Lauriault, 2014: 8). The notion of “enactment” points
to how people forge and sustain specific realities (Mol,
2002; Siles, 2013). As Seaver (2017) explains, “actors do
not act on pre-given objects, but rather bring them into
being” (p. 4). We argue that folk theories enact data
assemblages by forging specific links between their con-
stitutive dimensions. Seen in this way, algorithms stand
as a synecdoche of larger data assemblages (Gillespie,
2016). For this reason, we think it is necessary to go
beyond an exclusive focus on how users think that
Spotify works and also contemplate how they make
sense of other dimensions of data assemblages, such
as the platform’s place in their daily lives and social
relations, how they think it makes money, what their
typical appropriation practices are, what other plat-
forms and devices they use, in what places they typi-
cally appropriate them, what kind of social groups they
belong to, etc. This approach helps to situate systems
of thought about datafication within the wider context
in which the mechanisms and affordances of platforms
acquire certain cultural meaning.
If users enact data assemblages through folk theo-
ries, then it becomes crucial to understand why people
espouse certain theories over others. To account for
this, we draw on the work of Swidler (1986, 2001)
(cf. Toff and Nielsen, 2018). For this author, culture
is “a bag of tricks or an oddly assorted tool kit [. . .]
containing implements of varying shapes that fit the
hand more or less well, are not always easy to use,
and only sometimes do the job” (Swidler, 2001: 24).
Culture provides individuals with certain kinds of
capacities: to perform specific identities, internalize
habits, negotiate belonging to social groups, and
express certain worldviews (Swidler, 2001). In
Swidler’s (2001) words, “Culture equips persons for
action both by shaping their internal capacities and
by helping them bring those capacities to bear in par-
ticular situations” (pp. 71–72). We argue that users
espouse specific folk theories (as opposed to or along-
side others) as they seek to develop cultured capacities
through the use of technologies such as Spotify.
The notion of enactment also emphasizes the cen-
trality of user practices in bringing into being certain
data assemblages through folk theories (Seaver, 2017;
Siles, 2013). Put differently, folk theories also matter
for how they speak to issues of agency: they allow
people to act in certain ways. Swidler’s notion of
“strategies of action” helps understanding how people
act through folk theories. She defines these as “general
solutions to the problem of how to organize action over
time, rather than specific ways of attaining particular
ends [. . .] [They] provide [. . .] one or more general ways
of solving [. . .] difficulties” (Swidler, 2001: 82–83).
Through particular practices and strategies, people
enact specific modalities of power and resistance in
relation to algorithms. This, we suggest, enables a
better understanding of what agency means in the age
of algorithms.
Research design
This study was carried out in Costa Rica, a country
that illustrates the interest that digital platforms such
as Spotify have in Latin America: it has a relatively
large middle-class, high Internet connectivity rates,
and a reliable telecommunications infrastructure
(Gao, 2015). Spotify arrived in the country in late
2013, and its user base has grown steadily since.
A recent study showed that Spotify is among the
most-used entertainment apps on mobile phones in
Costa Rica (Red 506, 2018).
We opted for a research design of the qualitative
kind to “delve into the workings of assemblages”
from the perspective of users (Kitchin and Lauriault,
2014: 14). This type of methods have proved a valuable
asset for critical data studies in that they allow to
understand the centrality of “social context [. . .] in
both the production and interpretation of meaning
[and the] ever-present cultural regimes of interpretation
[that] structure the analysis of all data, ‘big’ or small”
(Dalton and Thatcher, 2014). They also help to “map
different values for data evoked in different discourses
of and contexts for data” (Fiore-Gartland and Neff,
2015: 1471). Our findings come from triangulated
data (by using multiple sources), methods (by combin-
ing different strategies), and investigators (by employ-
ing various observers of the same phenomenon).
Our study employed three methods: interviews,
focus groups, and rich pictures. We began by selecting
a sample of Spotify users for interviews. Similar to pre-
vious studies, we shared a call for participants on social
media profiles associated with the university where the
research was conducted (DeVito et al., 2018). Beuscart
et al. (2019) have shown that “heavy” users tend to
explore more features in music streaming platforms
than casual users. For this reason, we selected individ-
uals who identified themselves as “heavy” users of
Spotify, in order to identify people with more experi-
ence and a deeper understanding of the platform. This
strategy allowed us to interest many individuals who
had reflected specifically on how algorithmic recom-
mendations work (thus enabling the formation of intu-
itive theories) but could have prevented us from
identifying theories that come from more casual uses
of the technology.
We selected 30 individuals among respondents for
semi-structured interviews through a criterion strategy
that fostered diversity in sociodemographic profiles.
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Our sample included 15 men and 15 women,
19–52 years old, mostly educated, and from a variety
of professional backgrounds. We interviewed this
group of people between August and November 2018
at the University of Costa Rica for an average of
40min. Since this university is located in the country’s
capital (San Jose), this sampling strategy also allowed
us to talk with individuals who lived in several prov-
inces of Costa Rica’s Central Valley, where the major-
ity of the population resides. Interviews focused on the
history and practices of music consumption, but also
included conversations about people’s backgrounds
and social contexts, and their use of various media
technologies. Using an adapted version of the “think
aloud protocol” (Fonteyn et al., 1993), we asked par-
ticipants to open their Spotify account on a computer,
which was projected on a screen. We then asked par-
ticipants to explain the content shown on their
accounts and the context of the recommendations dis-
played. We specifically requested explanations of how
they thought that Spotify works and how it recom-
mended this music to them. Interviews were recorded
and transcribed in their entirety.
Second, we conducted four focus groups with 22
additional individuals (aged 18–62 years old) between
August and October 2019. We employed the same sam-
pling strategy described in the previous paragraph.
That is, we fostered sociodemographic diversity in
our sample (although almost all our participants have
received higher education in various fields). Focus
groups are ideal for exploring the social nature of
folk theories, that is, how they form as people share
them with others (including the researchers). Thus, in
addition to gathering data on how individuals
accounted for algorithmic recommendations, during
the focus groups we also examined the dialogues, dis-
cussions, and collective construction of folk theories
(Cyr, 2016). We focused on both the responses to our
questions about the use of Spotify and the debates that
unfolded to answer these questions. Focus groups were
also recorded and transcribed.
We carried out a third research method, namely rich
pictures. Rich pictures are a building block of the so-
called soft systems methodology, an approach that
emerged in the late 1970s to help actors in conflict
reach agreements using a variety of visualization tech-
niques (Checkland, 1981). We argue that some of these
techniques, most notably rich pictures, can be used in
the context of scholarly research as a tool for analyzing
“complex situation[s] [and to] provide a space by which
participants can negotiate a shared understanding of a
context” (Bell et al., 2019: 2).
Rich pictures consist of diagrams or drawingsmade by
individuals to graphically represent a specific phenome-
non.We employed this technique as amethod formaking
more explicit the unstated and taken-for-granted nature
of users’ knowledge of algorithms and data assemblages.
We provided participants in focus groups with blank
sheets and a set of pens. We then asked them to individ-
ually draw how they thought that Spotify worked and
how it provided them with specific music recommenda-
tions. After explaining the exercise and allowing for suf-
ficient time for the making of the pictures, images became
the starting point of conversations during focus groups.
Participants explained their own pictures and discussed
aspects of other participants’ drawings. The research
team functioned as a facilitator of these conversations.
We then analyzed these pictures by identifying the main
patterns in relation to three specific questions: how did
users represent Spotify? How did they express a relation-
ship with the platform? How were algorithmic recom-
mendations explained? We used Bell and Morse’s
(2013) guide to this end and thus coded for patterns in
descriptive features and structures (such as use of colors,
shapes, thickness, relationships, and arrangements,
among others).
We drew on grounded theory to analyze and inte-
grate the findings from different methods and sources
into theoretical constructs. We fostered investigator tri-
angulation by mixing individual coding and team anal-
ysis during three rounds of coding. First, we identified
the variety of ways in which people made sense of algo-
rithmic recommendations. This round was conducted
individually by each member of the research team. The
second round was conducted collectively and focused
on comparing similitudes and differences in how each
member of the team had coded users’ accounts of algo-
rithms. Finally, the third round of coding sought to
aggregate the data into broader categories that cap-
tured the main patterns and relationships.
In this way, we identified two main folk theories. We
focus specifically on these two theories because of how
representative they are of the data and because they
were the most coherent ones in the sense given by
Gelman and Legare (2011), that is, they reflected the
strongest interrelationships between concepts and
beliefs in our data. The next section presents the results
of this analysis. We integrate into our discussion
excerpts from interviews and focus groups, as well as
examples from rich pictures. (Interviews and focus
groups were conducted in Spanish. All translations
are our own.)
Folk theories of algorithmic music
recommendations
Most participants in our study defined themselves as
heavy and satisfied Spotify users. They have domesti-
cated this platform into a regular component of their
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daily lives. How users think of Spotify’s algorithms
stems in part from how they conceive of infrastructures
and technologies other than this platform. Users typi-
cally incorporate their experiences with other algorith-
mic devices into their understanding of Spotify.
Links to other algorithms were established through
two main dynamics. On the one hand, users aggregated
their experiences with a variety of technologies into a
general imaginary or stock of beliefs from which they
draw to interpret all algorithms. Juliana, a 45-year old
PhD student in environmental studies, thus assumed
that Spotify’s and Netflix’s algorithms shared a
common logic toward standardization: “Over the
years, I’ve seen what the [Spotify] algorithm offers to
me and, it’s just like with Netflix: it keeps recommend-
ing me always the same [content].” Similar comments
were made in relation to platforms such as Facebook.
But, on the other hand, users establish patterns of
difference when they compare platforms that they
think accomplish the same purpose (in this case, rec-
ommend music). Mario, a musician, thus noted during
one of our focus groups: “[My understanding of
Spotify] is built by contrasting it with Apple Music,
which is completely different. [Apple Music] is more
like ‘my music.’ I don’t want anybody else to have
access to it.” Similarly, users compared Spotify and
YouTube repeatedly. For this reason, folk theories
need to be understood as part of larger data
assemblages.
In what follows, we discuss the main theories that
explain how they think Spotify makes recommenda-
tions and why they think these recommendations are
successful (or not).
Dealing with a surveillant “buddy”
A common theory is to conceive of Spotify as a person-
like being that engages in surveillance to provide a
higher good: music recommendations. This theory is
based on the premise of “mutual personalization”
(Siles et al., 2019a): while users turn the platform into
a reflection of their personality, they also personalize
the platform by treating it as an entity that has
human-like characteristics. In this process, people
draw on local conceptions of friendship and public
behavior to make sense of the platform and its
algorithms.
Users employed expressions such as “a little
dummy” or “toy” (un mu~nequito), or “my little
buddy,” to refer to Spotify. As Figure 1 exemplifies,
the most common way to depict the platform in this
theory was by characterizing it as having features such
as eyes, hands, legs, hair, and even a (smiling) face. In
Figure 1(a), there is no major distinction in how
humans and Spotify are represented.
An exchange between participants during focus
groups helps to further understand the features attrib-
uted to the platform:
Interviewer: How do you define Spotify? What do you
think it is?
Mariana: Someone very intense.
Laura: Yes, a stalker.
Gloriana: But I wouldn’t want to humanize it. It is
better to say that it is an online hacker.
Maria: Like a little ghost or weird little thing who says
to you: “I saw that yesterday you were driving home
and were listening to this. [Raises voice] I THINK
YOU WILL LIKE THIS.” And then just leaves . . .
During this conversation, Gloriana realized the under-
lying dynamic of the theory, that is, the personification
of Spotify. Her immediate reaction was to tone down
this tendency by expressing a desire not to “humanize
it.” Yet, as an alternative, she still put forth the notion
of a person whose face is always hidden from plain
Figure 1. Representations of Spotify as a human-like being. (a) Spotify and user are drawn the same way. (b) A surveillant Spotify with
eyes, arms, and legs. (c) Spotify has the user’s hair.
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sight or who is not easy to recognize. As this conver-
sation reveals, users also employ human-like character-
istics to conceptualize those features they don’t like
about Spotify. Thus, they criticize receiving unre-
quested algorithmic recommendations constantly by
defining the platform as “a very annoying dude” or
“the most intense of your friends.”
How to determine when a person has become
“annoying” or too “intense” is of course a cultural pro-
cess. It is not surprising that these terms are mentioned
in Costa Rica, a country where “the importance of the
collective and maintenance of harmony are valued over
personal satisfaction” (Rodrıguez-Arauz et al., 2013:
49). As a human-like being, Spotify’s algorithmic rec-
ommendations thus need to comply with local rules of
friendship and public behavior. Users thus prefer that
algorithms hide their “face” rather than draw attention
to them by providing one too many unsolicited recom-
mendations that disrupt harmony.
Users invoked human-like characteristics also to
refer to the financial dimensions of this data assem-
blage. In this way, they questioned the motivations
behind the platform’s recommendations. According
to Maria, “I know that he wants us to be friends
because he is making money. He laughs with me, but
he is not feeling anything behind that smile” (emphasis
added). In this account, Spotify is an insincere male
counterpart who is primarily motivated by greed.
Personifying Spotify is a crucial way to naturalize
issues of surveillance. There is a generalized belief that
Spotify is watching everything users do on the plat-
form. Users typically captured this by drawing
Spotify as an eye. Gloriana, a 20-year old student,
gave the following explanation of Figure 1(b):
“Spotify watches my life, it is there watching us. I’ve
connected my [account] to Facebook, and [Spotify]
thus has lots of information to process.” Yet, more
than a “Big Brother,” Spotify is seen as a “Dear
Brother.” It is, after all, a “buddy.” Users conceive of
surveillance as a necessary condition for receiving the
benefit of useful recommendations. They envision algo-
rithmic recommendations as a constant reminder that
one is being observed for a reason that seems justified.
Pablo, the 23-year old electric engineer who referred to
Spotify as “a little dummy” and depicted it as a stick
figure with a smiling face, explained Figure 1(a) thusly:
“I heard that electronic gadgets listen to us and that’s
how [companies] can learn our tastes, what every
person likes . . .That’s a bit scary, but that’s how
things are.”
As Segura and Waisbord (2019) argue:
In Latin America [. . .] the politics of data surveillance
work differently than in the United States and other
Western countries insofar as states historically did not
develop massive, effective large-scale operations for
gathering, analyzing, and managing data about popu-
lations during the past half century. (p. 417)
This is particularly salient in Costa Rica, which has
built a national identity around the idea of peace
since 1948—when the military was abolished
(Sandoval, 2002). In the absence of historical prece-
dents to evaluate its consequences, surveillance seems
like less of a threat (it is only “a bit scary”).
Moreover, according to users, surveillance is the
precise factor that endows the platform with its great
capacities. For example, people think that this allows
Spotify to know users and, as a result, to better under-
stand them. Pablo further explained:
Spotify, the little dummy, asks: ‘What would you like
to listen?’ It knows my tastes a little bit and [adjusts] if I
want something heavier, if I’m sad, or upset, or happy,
if I want something more chill or something for
any occasion . . . it always knows what I want.
(Emphasis added)
In this example, Spotify acts like a psychologist who
not only recognizes the user’s moods and desires but
also helps him recognize his own emotions and affec-
tive states (Siles et al., 2019b).
As a human-like entity, users conceive of Spotify as
part of their most intimate social relations and daily
activities. Laura, an architecture student, explained:
“[Spotify] is very much ingrained in my social relation-
ships. It influences a lot how I interact with people
around me.” Like Laura, users interpret the possibili-
ties offered by the platform to share music with
others, learn what they are listening to, and talk
about music with them as a means to shape their rela-
tionships. Maria, who created Figure 2, noted:
“[Recommendations] generate shared interests and a
form of bonding with someone else.” In this way,
users envision Spotify as a privileged social intermedi-
ary: its algorithmic recommendations are not only a
way to form or strengthen a tie but also an intrinsic
part of that relationship.
People mentioned three kinds of factors to account
for how Spotify makes recommendations: practices of
music consumption (such as frequency and listening
rituals); the moods and affective states surrounding
these practices; and the singularities of the music
itself (meta-data about music genres, styles, tempo,
etc.). As the next section shows, these criteria are not
unlike what other folk theories suggest. What is distinc-
tive is the logic that explains how these factors are
combined and turned into personal recommendations.
For people who think of Spotify in this way, the main
criterion employed by the platform to recommend
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music is the construction of patterns based on similar-
ity with users who share sociodemographic character-
istics with them. This is consistent with the belief in
Spotify as a central social intermediary. Leo, an audio-
visual producer and self-taught musician, aptly summa-
rizes this view: “I imagine that what the platform wants
is to average between factors” (emphasis added). For
Leo and other users, algorithms recommend the most
typical or common music heard by particular social
groups (of which Spotify is an intermediary) so that
they can reveal the preferences of most people.
Training the algorithms of a “feedback control
system”
Another common folk theory is to conceive of Spotify
as a non-human yet responsive entity that can be
trained to obtain results (in the form of algorithmic
recommendations). Some users see it as a computation-
al machine that provides expected results if appropriate
input is given. These users employed terms such as “a
very long code” or “a feedback control system” to
define it. As Figures 3 and 4 show, most users who
espoused this theory turned to basic geometric figures,
such as squares, rectangles and circles, or simply
Spotify’s logo, to graphically represent the platform.
Others preferred metaphors that stressed the abun-
dance of resources: “a mine of minerals,” “an
encyclopedia,” a “catalog,” “a database,” and a
“world.” The notion of “resources” is central in
Costa Rica’s imaginary of national identity. By using
expressions such as “No Artificial Ingredients” and
“Only the Essentials” as international marketing cam-
paigns in the past, the country has consistently empha-
sized the notion that the kind of resources available is
what makes a place unique. These definitions thus
create a view of Spotify as a machine that offers valu-
able and exclusive resources.
Figure 2. Representation of Spotify as embedded in social relations and daily life.
Figure 3. Use of basic geometric figures to represent Spotify.
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This theory reproduces some of the main premises of
the discourses that have surrounded music streaming
platforms in other parts of the world. It emphasizes
ideas aptly expressed by Harvey:
streaming platforms aim to zero in on the tastes of the
individual listener. [. . .] the recording industry is [. . .]
betting on a future of distribution and discovery dic-
tated by quantification [. . .] to execute the recording
industry’s century-long mission: suggesting with math-
ematical detail what a listener wants to hear before
they know they want to hear it. (Harvey, 2014, empha-
sis added)
By adopting this logic almost word by word, users sug-
gest that data assemblages in a place like Costa Rica
are not necessarily different than in other countries.
Moreover, it signals that users are strategically estab-
lishing equivalences among the operations of data
assemblages around the world.
Whereas the first theory emphasized the notion of
surveillance as the root of appropriate recommenda-
tions, this theory focused on the properties of techno-
logical systems in ways that are reminiscent of
cybernetics. Users conceived of Spotify as a machine
that aims at improvement through increasing specificity
and precision in music recommendation. As Ruben, an
electrical engineering student, put it: “Obviously,
[Spotify] will never be perfect. You may like its recom-
mendations or not. If you do, that’s a positive
feedback. It will give you more things like that and it
will become more and more precise.” For Gabriel, a
political scientist, this requires time and repetition. He
thus explained the process of improving algorithmic
recommendations as “a system that is cyclical.”
This theory asserts that appropriate “feedback”
(through endless iterative loops) is what improves the
Spotify machine. By feedback, users referred mostly to
engaging in certain practices and using certain features
to help Spotify’s algorithms capture what counts as an
appropriate recommendation and what does not. The
preferred metaphors to label these feedback-giving
practices were “training” or “teaching” algorithms.
Referring to the streaming services she uses, Juliana
explained this with words that could have been used
to describe pet training:
Out of nowhere, [they] ‘throw’ [recommend] something
that I don’t like and I’m like: ‘But, what is this? That’s
a no, no, no.’ I go ahead and delete them [these songs]
and tell them [streaming services]: ‘Not this.’ I am thus
training them a little bit so they won’t recommend me
such things. These last few years have been of training
and there is not as much surprise [in music
recommendations].
The theory discussed in the previous section conceived
of Spotify as embedded in social relations. In contrast,
these users think of data assemblages as divided in two
clear-cut dimensions: on the one hand are humans (and
Figure 4. Distinction between Spotify (technology) and users (society).
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their ideas, practices, and relations) and on the other
are technologies (and their materialities, infrastruc-
tures, business models, marketplaces, etc.). Figure 4
provides a graphic representation of this common
belief. Mario, the musician who created this picture,
explained: “I split it into two categories: First, the cor-
poration [Spotify] itself, which provides the catalog.
Second, the users. These are all connected and you
can even see in real time what someone else is listening
to.” In this account, social relations are a strictly
human dynamic.
Similarly, Viviana, an engineering student, decided
to draw two different pictures during the focus group.
When pressed to explain why, she indicated: “Because
to me these are two completely independent things;
[one] is how they designed the platform, its code; and
[the other one] is what every person feels.” This theory
frames the use of the platform as a long-term relation-
ship between these two different domains (human and
technological). Mario thus reinterpreted the metaphor
of feedback: “Users feed the platform and the platform
gives them content in return.” Algorithmic recommen-
dations are seen as evidence that this relationship is
evolving over time.
Users invoked the same factors to account for how
they received algorithmic recommendations than those
discussed in the previous theory: music consumption
practices; the moods and affective states surrounding
these practices; and the characteristics of music itself.
However, this theory provides a distinct rationale to
explain how these factors are combined or, more pre-
cisely, calculated by the Spotify machine. Here the logic
is one of individualization, rather than average.
Individualization results from the power of quantifica-
tion. Says Ruben, “This is a system based purely on
numbers. If I choose a song, that’s a number. What the
software does is take the data and make a comparison
[between numbers].” Viviana added: “What I feel is
that [Spotify] has databases and generates a code so
that each person can follow a trail.” For these users,
algorithmic recommendations are codes that can only
be cracked individually by each person. These codes (or
“trails”) are the product of computational capacities
that aim to provide recommendations with mathemat-
ical precision.
For users, individualization means refinement in
music recommendation or, as Viviana described it,
“purification.” Mario explained his rich picture,
shown in Figure 4, in the following way:
On the side of the artists and the catalog, it seems to me
things are a bit more structured, and not so messy or
chaotic [as humans]. I did it gradually smaller, through
smaller boxes. There are big categories (genres, artists,
etc.), which keep getting smaller and smaller . . .
The premise behind this statement can be stated thusly:
although at first Spotify offers users songs that could
be recommended to anybody, with the appropriate
feedback the platform will gradually “add and sub-
tract” data input (as a user put it) until it recommends
music that is only appropriate for each individual.
Folk theories and cultured capacities
These two theories point to somewhat different cultural
directions: one emphasizes the need to make algorithms
fit into prevailing conceptions of friendship and social
behavior, while the other suggests that algorithms (and
the data assemblages they represent) do not operate
differently in countries like Costa Rica. To further
understand why people espouse either one of these
folk theories (or both), we turn to Swidler’s (1986,
2001) approach to culture. We argue that people
adopt folk theories “to construct, maintain, and refash-
ion the ‘cultured capacities’ that constitute actors’ basic
repertoires for action” (Swidler, 2001: 71). People draw
on specific folk theories as resources that allow them to
foster certain cultured capacities. Users in our study
mobilized these two folk theories to strengthen three
specific capacities: to be a specific kind of person, to
negotiate a sense of belonging in certain social groups,
and to sustain or strengthen ongoing social relations.
One of the most prevalent reasons that led users to
espouse a specific theory were issues of identity. People
think of Spotify and its recommendations as a way of
performing a self, of being or becoming a certain kind
of person. During an interview, Roberto, a 39-year old
psychologist, described his relationship with the plat-
form in the following way: “[Using it] suggests that you
can have a refined taste, it is not only for others but
also for yourself.” Roberto thus considered that spe-
cific parts of the self (such as “taste”) were at stake in
how he used the platform. Both theories discussed
above operated as markers of identity in this way.
Like Roberto, those who personified Spotify integrated
recommendations into definitions of the self. This is
captured with precision by Laura’s words: “Each
thing that Spotify recommends to me is very much
mine; when other people see it, I feel naked.” Behind
this assertion lies the premise that Spotify is embedded
in social relationships and, as a result, it provides a
window for others into the most private aspects
of the self.
It was common for interviewees and participants in
focus groups to justify their theory to others based on
their academic major, profession, or trade. Roberto
argued that his conception of the platform was “a
very social psychology thing.” Some of those who
thought of Spotify primarily as a computational
system quickly clarified that their understanding of
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the platform was a product of their academic training.
For example, Ruben noted that the term “feedback
control system” came from the field of electrical engi-
neering. Gabriel also indicated that his conception of
Spotify as a “system” was a product of his training in
political science. In this way, folk theories become an
expression of who the person is and wants to be seen.
To be a “good” psychologist or engineer is to think of
the platform and the self in particular ways.
Confronted by a clear articulation of the Spotify as
social being theory given by another participant in a
focus group, Viviana—the engineering student—asked:
“Are you an Arts major or something similar?”
It would be misleading to interpret that people hold
folk theories based exclusively on their profession. In
our sample of informants, there were examples of engi-
neers who personified Spotify and artists who thought
of it as a system. Instead, we argue that ideas associated
with specific majors (such as skills and professional
routines) allow users to bring specific capacities to
bear in certain situations, such as defining themselves
by how they appropriate the platform. Established
understandings of professions offer useful symbolic
resources to obtain self-forming capacities.
Folk theories also operate as a way to negotiate
group membership. This is by no means a minor
issue in Costa Rica, where more importance is usually
placed on “group affiliation (as opposed to personal
achievement)” and where “interpersonal bonds are
highly valued” (Rodrıguez-Arauz et al., 2013: 49).
The premise here is that knowledge of certain phenom-
ena (bands, styles, artists, etc.) is shared by all members
of a group. Adopting those phenomena thus becomes a
way to signal membership. This cultural capacity is of
key concern for those who personify Spotify. To be
sure, people have traditionally seen music itself as a
means of being part of certain groups. But how users
achieve this capacity now rests on how they specifically
think that Spotify’s algorithms work. For example, for
Carla, a 52-year old audit specialist, believing that
Spotify recommended music by averaging collective
preferences was crucial in following recommendations
or not. She explains, “[I began using it] maybe to not
feel so outdated that sometimes I have to ask what
young people are doing these days. They feed me a
lot in that sense so I don’t stay behind.” In this way,
she argues, the platform allows her to “understand
what are today’s tendencies” in music consumption.
This explanation combined both matters of content
and issues of technology (Siles and Boczkowski,
2012), that is, an idea of how algorithms capture cer-
tain substance (the music of “young people”) and a
belief of how this is achieved (averaging what most
users listen to into group “tendencies”).
A similar example comes from those who have
adopted the logic of individualization and quantifica-
tion to explain how algorithms work. As noted above,
this theory reproduces the main tenets of how various
platforms promote their services and algorithms (Prey,
2018). By incorporating this rationale into their system
of thought, users suggest that, despite the geographic
distances, they can enact (and thus inhabit) the same
data assemblage than those in other parts of the world.
Many users in Costa Rica interpret differences in cata-
logs (that is, the substance of what is being recom-
mended) as a form of exclusion (Siles et al., 2019a).
They typically react against not having the same con-
tent available in other countries (despite paying the
same fees).
This form of thinking also applies to technological
infrastructures (that is, how recommendations work).
Users expect that technologies will function the same
way everywhere. Explaining how he became a Spotify
user, one interviewee recalled, “A friend who lives
abroad said to me: ‘This is what everyone is using
now and you have to use it!’ He was referring to
using Spotify on the computer and on the phone.”
Porter (1995) famously argued that quantification is a
technology of “distance” that allows seeing phenomena
from afar. Yet users in this case tend to value it for the
opposite reason: it makes them feel closer to a world
that they aspire to be a part of. They value algorithmic
recommendations as a technology of “proximity” that
helps them feel connected to global conversations
about music and technology.
Users also adopt certain theories to foster the capac-
ity of keeping or strengthening social relations that are
meaningful to them. This capacity is aptly captured by
Levy’s (2013) notion of “relational big data”: “people
constitute and enact their relations with one another
through the use and exchange of data” (p. 75, emphasis
in original). Considering social relations as central to
music consumption is a key in personifying Spotify.
Carla, the audit specialist, explains:
I prefer the personal over the digital. I feel like I can
put a face [to recommendations]. That’s a trigger for
me. It makes me say, ‘I have to look at this song
because it was someone [who recommended it]’.
Emotionally, it’s not the same.
Personifying Spotify thus creates fertile grounds for
accepting its recommendations. It also solidifies the
view that Spotify is an ideal intermediary of social
ties. As Pablo, the electric engineer, put it, “Spotify
[is a matter] of social relations with my friends because
it gives us conversation topics, it connects you even
more with the people you love.”
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A specific instance of this dynamic is the use of
Spotify to maintain certain social relations through
music. Many users indicated that they began listening
to certain artists or songs because they reminded them
of those who helped discover this music. This means
that they acquired the habit of listening to certain
music because they were exposed to it through another
person. In these cases, the music stands in for the rela-
tionship as a form of “inheritance.” Personifying
Spotify is a way to keep musical inheritances and rela-
tionships alive.
Cultured capacities are thus central to understand-
ing why users espouse certain theories on specific occa-
sions and why they can oscillate between them. The
next section explains how these theories and capacities
are linked to specific user practices and ways of relating
to or resisting algorithms.
Agency, power, and resistance
Folk theories provide people with means to act in cer-
tain ways. In the case of Spotify, these theories provide
users with resources to carry out a specific set of strat-
egies of action through which they enact different
modalities of power and resistance in relation to rec-
ommendation algorithms.
Each folk theory posits that agency is distributed
differently between users and technologies such as
algorithms. Users who personalize Spotify tend to
attribute it a form of power that is difficult to elude.
This power stems from the platform’s place in their
interpersonal lives and from the knowledge it has
acquired from users through surveillance. Leo, the
audiovisual producer, stated:
[Once you begin using the platform] you sign the agree-
ment. There is no turning back. It is a demon. It takes
control of everything. When [Spotify] is over, it’s going
to be a shock. We’ll think: “Remember when it existed
and there were all those data that [we] gave to it?”
Not only does Leo describe the platform as a kind of
being, but he also emphasizes how powerful he thinks
its surveillance is: it ends up possessing the user in both
the sense of ownership and invasion. At that point,
Spotify stopped being a “buddy” and became a devil.
Instead, the theory that envisions Spotify as a
machine distributes agency in more symmetrical ways.
During a focus group, two individuals arrived at this
conclusion. Ruben began by stating: “I think the algo-
rithms feeds on the person”; Viviana immediately fin-
ished his response: “It needs it. And then vice versa.”
People mobilize different strategies of action based
on the theory they hold (and the agency they attribute
to the platform). The first theory we discussed oscillates
between two distinct action strategies: submission and
resistance. Users shift between these two strategies
based on their perception of surveillance. Studies
have shown a fundamental tension in people’s response
to surveillance, best captured by Lyon (2006): “the
more stringent and rigorous the panoptic regime, the
more it generates active resistance, whereas the more
soft and subtle the panoptic strategies, the more it pro-
duces the desired docile bodies” (p. 4). This conundrum
aptly describes users’ strategies of action in relation
to Spotify.
On many occasions, users think they are unable to
resist the platform. As Marcia, an Arts student, put it:
it is just too “addictive.” Her rich picture portrayed a
data assemblage oriented toward financial goals. In this
account, the objective of Spotify is to get users addicted
to the platform in order to make them pay a monthly
subscription. Yet, once again, users emphasize the ben-
efits of submission rather than the costs. For example,
people typically stress Spotify’s role as a social inter-
mediary to justify their inability to resist the platform.
When they do this, they downplay issues of surveillance
and normalize the appropriation of features that afford
a sense of being in contact with their networks of
social ties. Leo explained a strategy of action he
employs regularly:
I can’t finish one week without listening to my
‘Discover Weekly’ [an algorithmically curated set of
recommendations that changes on a weekly basis]
and the one from three more people. If not, I
wonder: ‘What could I be missing?’ It has to be
people whose music I admire or [who I follow] for
emotional reasons.
Leo described this strategy as a ritual he is unable to
stop practicing. By considering algorithmic recommen-
dations as a neutral window into other people’s lives,
people normalize the use of specific technological fea-
tures. Other affordances that allow this strategy are
watching what others are listening on the platform
(through the “Friend Activity” feature) and using the
“Charts” tab to listen to “Top 50” artists in the country
or other parts of the world.
Conversely, strategies of resistance tend to take
place when the surveillance of the Spotify being is
more explicit. For some, algorithms disrupt Costa
Rica’s much-valued social harmony when they “fail,”
that is, when they recommend songs that users deem
outside of their musical interests. At this point, algo-
rithms show their surveillant “face” rather than remain
hidden. According to one interviewee, “It always fails.
Let’s just say that, of all the times Spotify has recom-
mended something to me, I only like one song and
that’s the only song I like from that band.”
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For others, surveillance becomes evident because of the
way algorithmic recommendations are presented on the
platform: they are explicit, arrive constantly, and have
neither context nor explanation. Mario clarified this
point during a focus group:
I hate apps that suggest things to me! Do not tell me
what I need to listen to! If I do want to listen to some-
thing new, I just ask another real person. [. . .] And
there’s something else: I don’t like the interface. I feel
like I’m in a labyrinth, like I’m getting inside a hole.
(Emphasis added)
In a similar manner, Luis, a 19-year old college student,
indicated:
If an algorithm recommends it to me, I don’t know if
I’m going to listen to it, because it is always giving me
music, whether I like it or not. Sometimes I pay atten-
tion to it and sometimes I just ignore it. People do have
more value [than algorithms] because they do it [rec-
ommend music] personally.
Luis thus uses ignorance of algorithms strategically.
Other people indicated employing affordances that pre-
vent algorithmic recommendations to appear in the
first place, such as listening primarily to their playlists,
searching for specific songs, or pre-defining the queue
of songs they will listen to at any given time (cf. Siles
et al., 2019b).
The second theory we discussed is tied to a rather
different set of action strategies. The belief that users
are interacting with the platform is crucial in this case.
In this view, users and algorithms are interconnected
through feedback loops. Users expect that the Spotify
machine will accomplish its role in this relationship and
improve constantly to provide more specific music. In
this sense, reliability works as a “data valence” (Fiore-
Gartland and Neff, 2015). Accordingly, they place
responsibility on people: they need to hold up their end
of the bargain. This set of action strategies acquires the
status of an exigence. In order for individualization to
work, users consider it mandatory to engage in feedback-
giving practices such as letting the platform know wheth-
er they liked a particular song (by tapping the “heart”
feature), “following” an artist, and purposefully and
repeatedly listening to certain music to establish a pattern
that can be recognized by the platform. These strategies
need to be carried out constantly and almost without
exception to “train” algorithms appropriately.
Concluding remarks
This paper argued that folk theories matter for critical
data studies because they help to broaden our
understanding of how users make sense and relate to
datafication processes in daily life. They also enable a
better understanding of how people enact their agency
in relation to these technologies. To make this case, we
developed three main arguments.
First, we contended that folk theories help to exam-
ine the cultural specificities of datafication processes.
Because of the prevalence of this definition in the
USA and other Western countries, it might seem
“obvious” that people think of platforms like Spotify
as a computational machine aimed at individualizing
music experiences through Big Data procedures. Yet,
in this paper, we demonstrated that not all people think
of these platforms in this way. Alternatively, we pro-
posed to shift the analytical focus and investigate
instead why such definitions become “obvious,” for
whom, and under what circumstances. In the case we
examined here, what might seem “obvious” is the fact
that users think of algorithmic technologies as an inter-
mediary of social relationships. This is explained par-
tially by the fact that surveillance has a relatively
different history in Costa Rica and other countries in
the South. Even the cultural meaning of quantification,
perhaps well established in other places in the global
North, changes when one goes “beyond data universal-
ism” (Milan and Trere, 2019): users can adopt such
thinking not because it is “natural” or “inevitable”
but rather because it allows them to acquire a capacity
they value (such as participating in global conversa-
tions about music and technology).
Second, we provided an explanation of why users
enact certain folk theories (over or alongside others).
We built on the work of Swidler (1986, 2001) to suggest
that folk theories operate as resources that allow indi-
viduals to obtain cultured capacities such as perform-
ing specific identities, negotiate belonging to social
groups, and sustain existing social relationships.
Paraphrasing Swidler (2001: 36), we showed that
people do not simply have folk theories; they have
vivid stories about how they received recommendations
that shaped their social lives and selves. We envisioned
folk theories as part of cultural repertoires and practi-
ces through which people enact data assemblages and
their place in them. In this sense, folk theories become
useful or acceptable resources for people if they fit with
specific cultural situations and demands.
Third, we argued that folk theories offer a key entry
point into issues of agency in relation to algorithms. By
situating folk theories as critical parts of the “systems
of thought” that constitute data assemblages, we con-
ceptualized agency as a product of the relationship
between people and algorithms. Scholarly literature
tends to portray a one-sided scenario of “algorithmic
power.” In this paper, we sought to put forth an alter-
native to the tendency to assume rather than investigate
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algorithmic power. We showed that people do not
think or act in the same ways when relating to algo-
rithms. Concurring with Livingstone (2019), our per-
spective starts from the recognition “that all analyses of
media power include, implicitly if not explicitly, claims
about audiences, meaning that research with audiences
[. . .] must be brought within in the critical project”
(p. 179). Folk theories provide a useful resource to
this end.
Our approach also stressed an often-neglected
dimension of agency in research about users and algo-
rithms: imagination. Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 970)
consider the “projective element” represented by imag-
ination as one of the three components of the “chordal
triad of agency,” alongside with habit and judgment.
They explain, “Projectivity encompasses the imagina-
tive generation by actors of possible future trajectories
of action, in which received structures of thought and
action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to
actors’ hopes, fears, and desires for the future”
(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 971). Despite some
notable exceptions (Bucher, 2018), most accounts of
user interaction with algorithms have been limited to
discussions of the practical dimension of agency at the
expense of imagination. Accordingly, researchers have
located the agency of users in practices of resistance,
autonomy, and awareness (Beuscart et al., 2019; Eslami
et al., 2016). Yet, if algorithms are part of data assemb-
lages where power is produced, a much thorough
understanding of human and technological agency is
warranted. In this sense, folk theories offer a way of
empirically assessing how agency is enacted through
both practice and imagination. We contributed to this
critical project by showing how theories and imagina-
ries of algorithms relate to specific sets of action strat-
egies that shape modalities of power and resistance.
Further research could help to reach the analytic
promise of folk theories for critical data studies. We
suggest that a comparative research agenda could
offer fruitful avenues for future studies. This research
agenda rests on three building blocks. First, studies
that compare findings from different research methods
and data sources would help identify how users think of
algorithmic technologies. In this paper, we hope to
have shown the potential of various forms of qualita-
tive research and triangulation (data, method, and
investigator) for examining the workings of data
assemblages from the perspective of users. Because
technologies (such as algorithms) are complex proce-
dures hidden from plain sight and embedded in larger
socio-technical systems (Seaver, 2017), understanding
them can be challenging for users. Thus, a combination
of methods and sources with different sets of strengths
should provide a better opportunity to reveal why
people think (and act) as they do. In this sense,
qualitative methods provide an ideal supplement to
so-called digital methods. By focusing on the results
of users’ actions, digital methods offer great opportu-
nities to understand what people actually do when they
use technologies such as Spotify (rather than depending
exclusively on users’ self-accounts). Yet, they also run
the risk of taking for granted why people act the way
they do or of projecting the researchers’ own folk the-
ories onto users.
Second, because of the emphasis on culture, empir-
ical comparative studies of different geographical set-
tings should enable a better understanding of how
local or global certain folk theories are. In addition
to studies between (and within) countries, this line of
research could be conducted in different groups of
people and various moments in time. For example,
studies can be carried out with more casual users or
individuals without formal education to assess the gen-
eralization potential of the theories we identified.
Finally, research could examine the intuitive theories
that emerge from a comparison of how people domesti-
cate various platforms. As noted above, conceptions of
how algorithms work on Spotify were informed by the
use of other technologies (and vice versa). As a supple-
ment to studies that focus on one single platform,
research should account for how the proliferation of
media technologies and logics shapes how users under-
stand them both individually and collectively. After all,
using multiple platforms is one of the staples of con-
temporary media ecologies.
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